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Contingent Composition as Identity
Abstract
When the Necessity of Identity (NI) is combined with Composition as Identity (CAI), the
contingency of composition (CC) is at risk. In the extant literature, either NI is seen as the
basis for a refutation of CAI or CAI is associated with a theory of modality, such that:
either NI is renounced (if counterpart theory is adopted); or CC is renounced (if the theory
of modal parts is adopted). In this paper, we investigate the prospects of a new variety of
CAI, which aims to preserve both NI and CC. This new variety of CAI (CCAI, Contingent
Composition as identity) is the quite natural product of the attempt to make sense of CAI
on the background of a broadly Kripkean view of modality, such that one and the same
entity  is  allowed to exist  at  more than one possible world.  CCAI  introduces a world-
relative  kind  of  identity,  which  is  different  from  standard  identity,  and  claims  that
composition is this kind of world-relative identity. CCAI manages to preserve NI and CC.
We compare CCAI with Gibbard’s and Gallois’ doctrines of contingent identity and we
show that CCAI can be sensibly interpreted as a form of Weak CAI, that is of the thesis
that composition is not standard identity, yet is significantly similar to it.
§ 1. Introduction
A powerful argument proves that every instance of identity holds necessarily. On the other
hand,  many instances of  composition,  and in  particular  those involving concrete entities,
plainly seem to hold contingently. In the middle sits Composition as Identity (CAI), rather
uncomfortably: CAI is indeed the claim that every instance of composition is an instance of
identity.
Here is an instance of the powerful argument which proves identity to be necessary.
Everything is identical to itself. This claim does not depend on any peculiarity of the way in
which things contingently are. Thus, it holds necessarily that everything is identical to itself.
Take for example Trump. It  also holds for him: Trump is necessarily  identical  to Trump.
Thus, Trump has the property of being necessarily identical to Trump. Moreover, Trump is
identical to Donald: Trump and Donald are one and the same individual. As a consequence,
it  does not  make sense to think  that  there  is  a property  or  a  relation  such that  Trump
instantiates it  and Donald lacks it.  Thus, Donald shares with Trump also the property of
being necessarily identical to Trump.
Nothing in this reasoning depends on any peculiarity of Trump/Donald. Thus, not only
the identity of Trump and Donald, but also any other instance of identity holds necessarily.
This argument has convinced the majority of philosophers of the Necessity of Identity (NI).
Let us now see why many instances of composition are plainly contingent. Consider
the relation between Trump and the molecules composing Trump. Many of the molecules in
the external layer of Trump’s skin might have failed to be part of Trump. In this scenario
Trump would not be composed by some entities which actually compose him. Many other
events  in  the  life  of  Trump  might  have  gone  differently:  for  example,  he  might  have
undergone an additional hair transplant, who would have caused many other molecules to
become his  parts.  In this  scenario,  Trump would be composed by entities which do not
actually compose him. Analogous examples might concern a cat, a chair, an island or any
other concrete entity: their composition seems to be contingent as well. These reasonings
support  the  Contingency  of  Composition  (CC),  that  is  the claim that  many instances  of
composition are contingent. 
According  to  CAI,  composition  is  (or  is  significantly  analogous  to)  identity.  This
quickly leads (or should lead) to ask: 
How can composition be identity or significantly analogous to identity, if composition
and identity so sharply differ in their modal status? 
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It  might  seem  that  NI,  CC  and  CAI  are  an  inconsistent  set  of  thesis,  and  that,  as  a
consequence, at least one of them should go:
Necessity of Identity (NI). Every instance of identity holds necessarily.
Contingency  of  Composition  (CC).  Many  instances  of  composition  hold
contingently.
Composition as  Identity  (CAI).  Composition  is  (or  is  significantly  analogous  to)
identity.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  discuss  a  new variety  of  CAI  which  avoids  this
inconsistency and is compatible both with NI and with CC.  
By contrast, the extant literature on CAI, when it deals with the relation between CAI
and  NI  at  all,  accepts  that  NI,  the  contingency  of  composition  and  CAI  are  indeed  an
inconsistent of theses and goes in one of the following directions:
a) either CAI is rejected (Merricks 1999);
b) or NI is rejected, by endorsing a view of modality (counterpart theory) in which NI can
fail (Bøhn 2009; Borghini 2005);
c) or CC is rejected, by endorsing a view of modality (theory of modal parts) that makes
the resulting failure of CC palatable (Wallace 2014).  
We will label the new variety of CAI we are going to discuss Contingent Composition
as Identity (CCAI). CCAI claims that composition is a contingent variety of identity. CCAI
emerges  quite  naturally  when  we assume as  a  background,  in  dealing  with  the  modal
notions at stake, a broadly Kripkean view of modality, such that an entity is allowed to exist
at more than one possible world and inter-world identity is admitted. Given this background,
composition – as any other standard property and relation – is relativized to worlds. In order
to make sense of CAI while preserving this relativization, a relativized, contingent variety of
identity  is  introduced.  This  relativized,  contingent  variety  of  identity  does  not  replace
standard, absolute identity,  but flanks it:  absolute standard identity is needed in order to
express  the  modal  thesis  that  there  is  inter-world  identity,  while  relativized,  contingent
identity is needed in order to formulate CAI.
It is important to make clear from the beginning than we are not supporters of CCAI,
or of any other version of CAI. We think and we have argued in other works1 that other, non-
modal problems affect CAI in its various forms and we do not think that CCAI alleviates
these  non-modal  problems.  Nonetheless,  we  think  that  CCAI  contributes  to  show  that
modality is not  the terrain on which CAI should be refuted.  The extant  literature already
shows that CAI can be developed on the background of different views of modality, such as
those endorsed by Bøhn, Borghini and Wallace. However, as far as we know, nobody tried
to combine CAI with the Kripkean view of modality, a view which is implicitly assumed by
several modal logicians and explicitly endorsed by some metaphysicians. Our purpose is to
show that there is a credible version of CAI (CCAI) which is compatible with the Kripkean
view of modality and that, as a consequence, this rather common view of modality is not
incompatible with CAI.  
We proceed as follows. In § 2 we present the ways in which the relation between NI
and CAI is analysed in the current literature. In § 3 we present the broadly Kripkean view of
modality on the background of which we shall develop CCAI. In § 4, we show why, on the
background  of  such  a  Kripkean  view  of  modality,  composition  should  be  relativized  to
possible  worlds,  in  order  to  avoid  a  conflict  with  the  principle  of  the  Indiscernibility  of
Identicals. In § 5 we argue that the only way to make sense of CAI on the background of the
broadly Kripkean view of modality we assume is to relativize also identity to possible worlds,
and to formulate  the resulting  variety  of  CAI  (CCAI)  in  terms of  this  relativized  form of
identity. In § 6 we discuss the resulting distinction between the world-relative identity which
1 (Carrara & Lando 2016, 2017), (Lando 2017, Appendix)..
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composition would be on the one hand, and standard identity on the other. In § 7 we present
an important objection to CCAI, according to which CCAI would be ad hoc. In § 8, in order to
deepen the analysis of this problem, we compare CCAI with other non-standard theories of
identity,  specifically  Gibbard’s  theory  of  contingent  identity  (Gibbard  1975) and  Gallois’
theory of occasional identity (Gallois 1990, 1998). In § 9 we compare CCAI with the extant
varieties of CAI and we claim that CCAI should be classified as an interesting version of
Weak CAI, according to which composition is not strictly speaking absolute identity, but is
merely analogous to it. Finally, in § 10 we draw some conclusions about how CCAI fares in
comparison to other ways of addressing the modal problems of CAI. 
§ 2. Composition as Identity and the Necessity of Identity
The  interaction  between  CAI  and  NI  can  be  presented  in  a  seemingly  simple  way.  By
adopting even simpler formulations of CAI and NI than those adopted in § 1, one could be
tempted to argue as follows:
1) composition is identity (CAI);
2) identity is necessary (NI);
3) therefore, composition is necessary.
The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg compose Benelux. Thus, according to
CAI, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg are identical to Benelux. According to NI,
any instance of identity holds necessarily. Thus, the relation that holds between Netherlands,
Belgium and Luxembourg on the one hand and Benelux on the other (a relation that is an
instance  of  identity,  but  also  an  instance  of  composition)  holds  necessarily.  Thus,  the
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg necessarily compose Benelux.
Consider another example: a chair c is composed of four legs (l1, l2, l3, l4), a seat (s)
and a back (b). Given CAI, l1, l2, l3, l4, s and b are identical to the chair c. According to NI,
every instance of identity holds necessarily. Thus, l1, l2, l3, l4, s and b are necessarily identical
to  c. The relation between  l1, l2, l3, l4, s  and  b  on the one hand and  c  on the other holds
necessarily. Thus, l1, l2, l3, l4, s and b necessarily compose c.
Observe that the necessity of composition also leads to the necessity of parthood,
given some innocent mereological assumptions. Take the framework of classical extensional
mereology (a framework which is widely assumed in the debate about CAI). Composition is
simply the converse of mereological fusion: some entities tt compose an entity u iff u is the
mereological fusion of tt. Thus, it follows from the above reasoning, that, for any x and yy, if
x is the fusion of yy, then x is necessarily the fusion of yy:
(Necessity of Fusion)
Given any plausible definition of mereological fusion, the fact that  x is the fusion of
some yy entails that any entity z which is one of yy is part of x. For example, the following,
standard definition of fusion explicitly warrants this in the first conjunct of the definiens:
(Fusion Definition)
As a result, whenever x is the fusion of some yy (that is, x is composed of some yy), any z
which is one of yy is necessarily part of x (we will use ‘ ’ for the plural logic relation is one
of):
     (Necessity of Being Part of a Fusion)
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Now, consider (Plural Covering):2
(Plural Covering)
(Plural covering) warrants that, in any case of parthood between a part  x  and a whole  y,
there are some entities zz such that the part x is one of them and the whole y is the fusion of
them. (Necessity of Being Part of a Fusion) holds for any fusion and claims that every part of
this fusion is necessarily part of it. Thus, given a standard mereological framework and the
seemingly  innocuous  (Plural  Covering),  we  obtain  that  any  instance  of  parthood  holds
necessarily. This result is usually labelled as mereological essentialism. Here we will call it
(Necessity of Parthood):3 
(Necessity of Parthood)
According to the foes of CAI (such as  (Merricks 1999)), composition and parthood
are plainly contingent. As a consequence, composition lacks a constitutive feature of identity,
and the fact that composition lacks it would prove that composition is not identity, thereby
refuting CAI. Thus (Merricks 1999) chooses the option a) among the options we listed in § 1.
In  the  simple  argument  at  the  beginning  of  this  section,  3)  (the  necessity  of
composition) is unacceptable, inasmuch as it contradicts CC, a plain truth: every concrete
entity could have different parts.  Thus,  one of the two premises of  the simple argument
should be rejected. However, 2) might seem unassailable, insofar as necessity is usually
deemed a constitutive feature of identity. As (Barcan 1947) and (Kripke 1971) have shown,
the necessity  of  identity  follows  from the Necessary  Reflexivity  of  Identity  and from the
Indiscernibility  of  Identicals.  In  §  1  we  have  presented  an  instance  of  this  argument,
concerning Donald Trump. Here is the argument in his general form:
           (Necessary Reflexivity of Identity)
                (Indiscernibility of Identicals)
___________________________________________________________________
                              (Necessity of Identity – NI)
If 2) (NI) is unassailable in the light of the Barcan-Kripke argument, then the falsity of
3) (the necessity of composition) forces us to reject 1): composition is not identity.
On the other  side  of  the  dialectics,  the  friends of  CAI  have reacted to Merricks’
challenge in one of the following two ways.  Some backers of  CAI  (Bøhn 2009;  Borghini
2005)4 chooses the option b) in the list of § 1. Namely, they endorse counterpart theory, in
which identity is allowed to be as contingent as composition. Given counterpart theory, b)
2 See for example (Sider 2014, p. 212). 
3 The label  “mereological essentialism” comes from  (Chisholm 1976). However, the essentiality at
stake was meant simply as a necessity de re, without any commitment to the idea that parts are, as a
consequence of any of the arguments we are discussing, essential in a stronger sense, namely in the
sense of grounding what a whole is. This stronger understanding of essence-related terminology has
become common  (again)  following  (Fine  1994).  For  this  reason,  we  will  henceforth  refrain  from
speaking of mereological essentialism.   
4 In (Borghini 2005) there is not – strictly speaking – a defence of CAI, inasmuch as Borghini’s focus
is on counterpart theory. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact, Borghini shows that CAI can be made
compatible  with  CC,  provided that  various versions of  the theory of  counterparts  are  adopted.  It
should be noted that  (Merricks 1999) also admits that counterpart theory can make CAI compatible
with the contingency of composition and parthood, but limits this admission to a specific version of
counterpart theory. Nonetheless, Merricks is a foe of CAI, since he thinks that counterpart theory is a
wrong analysis of modality (Merricks 2003). 
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(NI) is rejected. The fact that composition is contingent does not show that composition is
not identity, insofar as identity is contingent as well.
Another backer of CAI (Wallace 2014)5 opts for c) in the list of § 1, and claims that
composition  and  parthood  are  indeed  as  necessary  as  identity,  and  that  (Necessity  of
Composition)  and  (Necessity  of  Parthood)  are  independently  plausible,  when  they  are
conjoined with a doctrine of  modal  parts.  Entities would have necessarily  all  their  parts,
including their modal parts: Trump would necessarily have a modal part in another possible
world, which has undergone an additional hair transplant. The motivations laying behind CC
would be satisfied by these modal parts: composition and parthood are necessary, but some
special parts (modal parts) make entities different in different possible worlds. 
We are not going to raise any objection against b) and c). We only aim to explore in
the next sections another variety of CAI, CCAI, which aims to be compatible both with NI and
with CC.
CCAI  distinguishes  two  varieties  of  identity.  One  of  them  is  standard,  absolute
identity, which is as necessary as the Barcan-Kripke argument shows it to be. The other
variety  of  identity  countenanced by CCAI  is  contingent.  Thus,  the necessity  of  standard
identity  (NI)  is  preserved.  Any  instance  of  composition  is  an  instance  of  the  second,
contingent variety of identity, thereby preserving also CC. CAI, NI and CC turn out to be
mutually consistent, in contrast with the assumption shared by a), b) and c) in the list of § 1.
How to obtain this result? We shall argue that CCAI is the only way to make sense of
CAI, once a Kripkean view of modality, and in particular the thesis that there is inter-world
identity,  is  assumed.  Let  us  begin  by  presenting  the  most  salient  traits  of  this  view  of
modality.
§ 3. Inter-World Identity, Indiscernibility and Relativization
Prominent philosophers such as Kripke, Plantinga, Stalnaker and recently Williamson6 agree
that  there  is  identity  across  possible  worlds  (or  inter-world  identity).  Individuals  exist  at
possible  worlds.  While  these authors disagree about  the nature of  possible worlds,  they
share the view that there is inter-world identity. There are many different possible worlds,
corresponding to maximal and consistent ways in which things might be. Some of them are
such that the same entity exists at all of them. Many maximal and consistent possible ways
in which things might be are such that, for example, Donald Trump would exist if things were
in that way: at some of these possible worlds Trump is married with Michelle LaVaughn
Robinson,  while  at  some  others  (including  the  actual  world  @)  he  is  not  married  with
Michelle. At some of them Trump is an ardent Democrat, while at some others (including @)
he is not. At some of them Trump is 5 feet tall, while at some others (including @) he is not 5
feet tall (at @ he is 6 feet 2 inches). Trump exists at all these possible worlds.
Identity is standardly construed as that relation which every entity bears to itself and
to nothing else. The claim that one and the same entity exists at various possible worlds
immediately leads to the claim that there is identity across different possible worlds. Donald
Trump – the same individual – exists at several different possible worlds. Also c, the chair in
our example above,  and all  the other entities involved in our examples,  exist  at  several
possible worlds. 
Is  there a problem of  inter-world  identity?  The standard,  Kripkean answer  to the
question is ‘no’. Those who argue for the problematicity of the notion of inter-world identity
do so on the grounds that we cannot make judgments of identity across worlds unless we
have a criterion for inter-world identity. So, if we judge that someone in an alternative world
is identical to Trump (to the chair c) we would need a criterion of identity saying under what
conditions a person p (a chair c) in a world w is identical to the person p’ (chair c’) in a world
w1. But at the end of the day it is rather difficult to find such a criterion. Kripke’s reply is that,
5 On the same topic, see also (Wallace 2009, Chapter 4).
6 (Kripke 1980; Plantinga 1974; Stalnaker 2003). In (Williamson 2013), not only entities are allowed to
exist at more than one possible world, but every entity exists at every possible world. 
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even if it is very difficult to find a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for identity, it does
not  follow that  the notion of inter-world identity is illegitimate.  The qualms on inter-world
identity are due to a certain picture on the nature of possible worlds understood as “a distant
country” (1980, p. 44). Possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered. And it is perfectly right
to stipulate them as including an actually existing particular, which – as a consequence –
exists at more than one possible world. 
We  are not assuming such a view as intrinsically  correct.  However,  it  is  a rather
common stance about modality: thus, it is interesting to know what follows from the Kripkean
view about CAI and whether – in particular – an interesting form of CAI can result  from
adopting it. 
Let us therefore focus on a feature of the Kripkean view which bears some significant
consequences  for  mereological  relations  and  for  CAI:  the  need  to  relativize  standard
properties and relations to possible worlds. One inter-world identity is taken on board, a well
known problem with the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals ensues. The principle of
the Indiscernibility of Identicals says that identical things share all their properties:
         (Indiscernibility of Identicals)
The problem ensues if we consider – for example – @, the actual world, at which Trump is
not an ardent Democrat; and w1, at which Trump is an ardent Democrat instead. Trump is
identical to himself. However,  being an ardent Democrat might seem to be a property that
Trump both instantiates and fails to instantiate, in contrast with (Indiscernibility of Identicals),
and even with the Principle of Non-Contradiction.
Luckily, the Kripkean view does not violate a solid principle such as (Indiscernibility of
Identicals) and leads to no contradiction. This is because in the application of the apparatus
of  possible  worlds  the violation  of  (Indiscernibility  of  Identicals)  is  avoided  by a form of
relativization to possible worlds. Trump is 6 feet 2 inches tall at @ and is not 5 feet tall at @,
but is 5 feet tall at  w1 and is not 6 feet 2 inches tall at  w1. In this way Trump (one and the
same individual) instantiates both the property of being 6 feet 2 inches tall at @, and the
property of being 5 inches tall at w1. Since a similar relativization is applied to every standard
property, no counterexample to (Indiscernibility of Identicals) ensues.
In the possible world semantics for modal languages, this does not usually require
applying an index to predicate letters. What happens is that, for each predicate letter, the
interpretation function of a Kripkean model structure assigns to each possible world a subset
of the domain of that world. This subset includes the entities that instantiate at that world the
property expressed by that predicate letter. 
Thus, world w1  has a certain domain, the set of the entities existing at that world. A
subset F of this domain includes as elements only the entities that are 5 feet tall at w1 (and
so includes Trump as a member, in our example). For the predicate that expresses in the
formal language the property of being 5 feet tall, the interpretation function assigns F to w1.
The  semantic  treatment  of  predicative  letters  is  radically  different  from the treatment  of
individual constants: in the case of individual constants, the interpretation function assigns to
each world the same member of the union of the domains of all  the possible worlds. By
contrast, the  extension  of a predicate letter is allowed to vary from world to world, and in
each world cannot go beyond the limits of the domain of entities existing at that world. 
The formula in the formal language that corresponds to the English sentence “Trump
is 5 feet  tall”  will  have,  as a consequence,  different  truth values at  different  worlds:  the
formula  is  true  at  a  world  w  iff  the  element  of  the  union  of  the  domains  which  the
interpretation function associates to the constant for Trump is a member of the set which the
interpretation  function  associates  to  the  predicate  for  being  5  feet  tall for  w.  Thus,  the
extensions of the predicates and the truth values of the formulas including those predicates
are indeed relativized to worlds. 
In what follows, we will not formulate the relativization as possible world semantics
usually  does.  By contrast,  we will  make the relativization to worlds explicit  in  the object
language, by marking the relativization of properties to worlds with an index for predicate
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letters: thus, “D@” is a predicate expressing the property of being an ardent Democrat at the
actual world, while “Dw1” is a predicate expressing the property of being an ardent Democrat
at  w1.  The  resort  to  indexes,  besides  being  simpler  than  the  explicit  resort  to  model
structures, underlines that we are directly interested in the fact that, in the context of the
Kripkean  view,  for  every  entity  t  there  is  no  single  property  P  such  that   and  .
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the indexes are not meant to suggest that
there are intensionally different  features that are ascribed by predicates that differ by their
index. The indexes merely signal that the extension of a certain predicate is allowed to vary
from world to world.
§ 4. World-Relative Mereological Relations
What is the impact on mereology of the Kripkean view of modality we characterized in § 3?
Mereological relations should be relativized to worlds in the sense we have explained. It has
no bearing on the need for this relativization that the predicates in mereology (such as P for
parthood,  for overlap,  for fusion) be relational, binary predicates, while the predicates for
properties such as  being 5 feet tall  or  being an ardent Democrat are monadic predicates.
The  need  for  a  relativization  arises  for  relations  as  much  as  for  properties,  quite
independently of any mereological consideration. London is to the north of Paris, but might
be to the south of Paris. This means that in the actual world London is to the north of Paris
and is not to the south of Paris, while in some other worlds London is to the south of Paris
and is not to the north of Paris. This does not elicit any counterexample to (Indiscernibility of
Identicals) in the Kripkean view of modality, because the relations of  being to the south of
and of being to the north of are relativized to worlds: this means that, for each world, there is
a different set of ordered pairs which is the extension of the corresponding predicate.
The same happens in the case of mereological relations. There is a notebook in front
of me on my desktop. Let us call it b. Consider s, the third sheet of paper in b. s has been
assembled (with the help of some glue) with the other sheets in b at the paper mill. However,
it is a contingent matter of fact that s has been assembled in that way, instead of becoming
part of another notebook, or instead of remaining unused due to the sudden bankruptcy of
the paper mill. At @ s is part of b. By contrast, at other worlds (say at w1), s is not part of b:
The same holds for the leg l2 and the chair c in our previous example. It is contingent
that l2 is part of c, thus:
Also  will be relativized. There is a magazine rack r at my place. Thus, f, the furniture
of my place, overlaps with the sum s of all the magazine racks in the world. But it is clearly a
contingent fact that I bought a magazine rack some months ago, thereby making it part of
the furniture at my place and determining an overlap between f and s. This does not make
the magazine rack f both overlap and fail to overlap with s: f is not discernible from itself. At
@ f and s overlap, but at other worlds they do not overlap.
 
As we have already remarked in § 2, it  is equally contingent  that  c  (the chair) is
composed of l1, l2, l3, l4, s and b (the legs, the seat and the back), or – equivalently – that the
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fusion of l1, l2, l3, l4, s and b is c. There are worlds in which c is composed of different parts,
and there are worlds  in  which  b  (for  example)  contributes to composing other chairs  or
different pieces of furniture. This does not make c (or b) discernible from itself, because also
composition and fusion should be relativized to worlds, as any other standard property or
relation. In @ the fusion of l1, l2, l3, l4, s and b is c. There are other worlds (say w1) in which
the fusion of l1, l2, l3, l4, s and b is not c. 
In  a  nutshell,  in  the  context  of  a  Kripkean  view  of  modality,  every  mereological
relation – including composition – should be relativized to worlds.
§ 5. From World-Relative Fusion to World-Relative Identity
Let us introduce CAI. CAI is the contention that composition is an identity relation. Thus CAI
is about a relation – composition – which, in the context of the Kripkean view of modality and
in order to preserve (Indiscernibility of Identicals), has to be relativized to worlds. CAI claims
about a world-relative relation that it is identity. 
The only way to make sense of CAI in this context is to assume that composition is a
world-relative kind of identity. Suppose that we instead say that composition is an identity
relation of the usual, absolute sort, which is not relativized to worlds. We would simply lose
track of the relativization of composition to worlds. The chair c is at @ the fusion of s, b, l1, l2,
l3 and l4. By contrast, l3 is not part at w1 of c and is replaced in it by another leg, l5. 
Now, suppose that both this instance of  and this instance of  are instances of
the common breed of identity: absolute, non world-relative identity. We would obtain that c is
absolutely identical both to s, b, l1, l2, l3, l4 and to s, b, l1, l2, l5, l4: 
Identity is obviously an Euclidean relation, so we might conclude that:
This conclusion is unacceptable, and incompatible with the definition of plural identity:
 (Plural Identity Definition)
l3 is one of s, b, l1, l2, l3, l4, but is not one of s, b, l1, l2, l5, l4; l5 is one of s, b, l1, l2, l5, l4 , but is not
one of s, b, l1, l2, l3, l4. Thus, given (Plural Identity Definition):
Once we have relativized composition to worlds, it is simply wrong to construe CAI as
the  claim  that  composition  is  standard,  absolute,  non  world-relative  identity.  One  might
obviously insist that CAI  is  the thesis that every instance of composition is an instance of
standard, absolute, non world-relative identity. However, there is something odd in insisting
in this context that composition is absolute, non world-relative identity. Given a world-relative
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relation, already prima facie it seems rather unwise to defend the thesis that that relation is
an absolute, non-world-relative relation (such as standard identity). This move is going to
clash  with  the reasons  why  we had relativized  composition  to  worlds  in  the  first  place,
thereby leading to unacceptable consequences. 
One might also, at this point, claim that these unacceptable consequences should
ignite a reductio of one of our assumptions, and in particular either of CAI or of the Kripkean
view of  modality.  For example,  (Merricks 1999) would  proceed from these unacceptable
consequences  to  a  reductio of  CAI:  given  NI,  identity  is  not  world-relative,  and  thus
composition is not identity. By contrast,  (Bøhn 2014),  (Borghini 2005) and  (Wallace 2014)
would proceed from these unacceptable consequences to a reductio of the Kripkean view of
modality, and in particular of the claim that there is inter-world identity. However, if you think
that  the  motivations  in  favour  of  CAI  are  solid,  then  Merrick’s  approach  will  be  hardly
desirable for you, and you will long for an alternative. By contrast, the approaches of Bøhn,
Borghini and Wallace are going to please whoever thinks that there are independent reasons
to replace the Kripkean view with an alternative view of modality, such as counterpart theory
or the theory of modal parts: for these philosophers, these unacceptable consequences are
simply symptoms of a wrong overall approach to modality. However, if you do not think that
there are these independent reasons to reject the Kripkean view, then the move of Bøhn,
Borghini  and Wallace  will  be  methodologically  dubious  to you,  and you will  long  for  an
alternative: CAI is a highly controversial thesis and it would be reckless to attribute to it alone
the dialectical burden of grounding a reductio of the widely adopted (and comparatively less
controversial) Kripkean view of modality. 
In  both  cases,  the  alternative  you  are  longing  for  is  a  variety  of  CAI  which  is
compatible with the Kripkean view of modality. The alternative is to claim that world-relative
composition is an unusual sort of identity, namely world-relative identity: the second variety
of identity to which CCAI is committed. According to this alternative, all the instances of a
world-relative relation (composition) are instances of another world-relative relation (world-
relative identity).
CCAI does not lead to the problem discussed above:  and  are not the same
identity relation, but two different world-relative identity relations (that is, ones with a different
extension), =@ and =w1:
The  world-relative  relations  =@ and  =w1 will  both  be  plausibly  Euclidean,  but  –
inasmuch as they are relativized to different worlds – there is no reason to infer that s, b, l1,
l2,  l3,  l4 are  identical  to  s,  b,  l1,  l2,  l5,  l4,  in  contrast  with  (Plural  Identity  Definition).  The
inference is blocked by the relativizations to worlds. What happens is that, in each world,
entities are identical to their parts. They are allowed to have different parts, and as a result
they are identical to different things in different worlds.  This conclusion is now acceptable,
and compatible with the definition of plural identity. 
At this point we are ready to formulate CCAI:
§ 6. World-Relative Identity versus Standard Identity
CCAI distinguishes two varieties of identity: standard, absolute identity and world-relative
identity.  CCAI  is  formulated,  as  we have seen,  in  terms of  the latter,  but  the former  is
required by the Kripkean view of modality on the background of which CCAI emerges as the
only way to make sense of CAI.
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Let us explain why it is not possible to get rid altogether of absolute, standard identity
and replace it with world-relative identity. Standard identity is used to express the pivotal
claim of the Kripkean view according to which there is inter-world identity. Inter-world identity
is nothing else than standard, absolute identity. It is expected to hold between any entity and
itself irrespectively of the world we are considering. So, for example, Trump exists at many
possible worlds and he is self-identical exactly in the same way at all these worlds. Not only
that, but in the Kripkean possible world semantics Trump is self-identical also in the worlds
at  which  he  does  not  exist.  This  is  because  the  identity  predicate  is  special:  its  usual
semantic interpretation reflects the fact that it has a notorious connection with logic. 
In § 3 we have seen that, in order to preserve (Indiscernibility of Identicals), every
standard property and relation has to be relativized to worlds, where this relativization simply
corresponds to the fact that the interpretation function in a model structure is such that the
extension of the corresponding predicate is allowed to vary from world to world. But identity
is different: the identity predicate is not treated on a par with other predicates in Kripkean
possible  world  semantics.  The identity  predicate  is  treated in  a special  way not  only  in
Kripkean possible world semantics,  but already in the semantics for  first-order logic  with
identity.  The  way  in  which  identity  statements  are  interpreted  is  not  by  resorting  to  an
extension of the identity predicate. The identity predicate is, from a syntactical viewpoint, a
binary relational predicate. However, the truth conditions of identity sentences do not have
the usual  set-theoretic  structure of  the  truth conditions  of  sentences where other  binary
relational predicates occur. In other words, the identity sentences are not said to be true iff
the ordered pair of the referents of the two terms surrounding the identity predicate is a
member of the set of ordered pairs which is the extension of the predicate. By contrast, in
the standard semantics of first-order logic with identity, an identity sentence is said to be true
iff the referents of the two terms surrounding the identity predicates are coreferential.7 
Thus, the truth value of an identity sentence – already in the first order logic with
identity – depends only on the referents of the referential expressions in it, without any role
for the extension of the identity predicate. The way in which the interpretation function works
for  referential  expressions  and,  in  particular,  for  individual  constants  is  a  characterizing
feature of the Kripkean view of modality. As we have already seen in § 3, the referent of an
individual  constant is not allowed to vary from world to world, in sharp contrast with the
extension of  a predicate.  The interpretation  function for  individual  constants assigns the
same individual to each world. This individual has not to be chosen exclusively from the
domain of that specific world. By contrast, it can be any member of the set-theoretical union
of the domains of all the worlds in the model structure.
As a consequence, the truth value of an identity sentence does not vary from world to
world. This is the way in which Kripkean possible world semantics encodes NI: given how
identity sentences are interpreted, there is no way in which the truth value of an identity
sentence could vary from world to world. Thus, if an identity statement is true at a possible
world (e.g. at the actual world @), then it is true at every possible world.8
Inter-world identity is simply the relation between Trump and Trump himself, between
Benelux and Benelux itself and between l2 and l2 itself. It is simply the relation which every
entity bears to itself and to nothing else, or – equivalently – the smallest reflexive relation on
the universal domain. It does not matter from the viewpoint of which world we look at it. 
7 (Carrara and Lando 2016) discusses the impact of the special semantic treatment of the identity
predicate on CAI.
8 When we pass from first-order logic to plural logic, there is another predicate which is arguably as
special as the identity predicate, namely “is one of” (≺). The semantic treatment of ≺ might be similar
to that of identity in not resorting to the extension of  ≺: a sentence such as “t ≺ uu” is true iff the
referent of “t” is one of the referents of “uu”. This semantic treatment of ≺ mirrors the prevailing idea
that  ≺ is  as  necessary  as  identity  (≺ is  strictly  connected  to  plural  identity,  see  (Plural  identity
Definition) above). This idea is defended by (Williamson 2010) and (Linnebo 2016). See  (Uzquiano
2011) for  some  objections.  (Hewitt  2012) has  explicitly  defended  the  minority  thesis  that  ≺ is
contingent. 
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Thus,  we  cannot  get  rid  of  standard  identity,  which  obeys  (Indiscernibility  of
Identicals). The relativizations of all the properties and relations (with the notable exclusion
of standard identity itself, as we have seen above) is motivated precisely by the need to
preserve (Identity of Indiscernibles) for standard identity. There is little doubt that standard
identity respects (Indiscernibility of Identicals). Suppose that for an entity t there is a property
P such that t instantiates P and fails to instantiate P:
Suppose that this property is S. We would obtain a contradiction:
Thus, denying (Indiscernibility of Identicals) for standard identity directly leads to a
contradiction.  The relativization  of  properties  and relations  we have discussed in  § 3  is
indeed motivated by the need to preserve this basic principle from modal counterexamples.
By contrast, consider the kind of world-relative identity postulated by  CCAI. As we
have seen above, it cannot replace standard identity, but can only flank it. How does world-
relative  identity  work?  A  trivial  difference  between  standard  identity  and  world-relative
identity is that the former is not world-relative, while the latter is. But a deeper difference
concerns  indiscernibility.  (Indiscernibility  of  Identicals)  for  world-relative  identity  could  be
formulated  with  a  universal  quantification  over  worlds,  without  any  restriction  on  the
properties at stake:9
   
(Absolute Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals)
However, (Absolute Indiscernibility of World-relative Identicals) is false, and its falsity
marks the crucial difference between world-relative identity on the one hand and standard
identity  on  the  other.  World-relative  identicals  are discernible,  and  in  particular  modally
discernible. c (our chair) is the fusion of s, b, l1, l2, l3, l4 at @ . According  CCAI c is identical
to s, b, l1, l2, l3, l4 at @ . 
However, it is possible, as we have seen above, that  l3  is no part of that particular
chair, and that another leg, l5, takes its place. Consider the world w1  where this happens. c
obviously  is  the  fusion of  c at  w1  (inasmuch as  being the fusion of  at  w1 is  a  reflexive
relation). By contrast, c is not the fusion of s, b, l1, l2, l3, l4 at w1.
This makes  c  on the one hand and  s, b, l1,  l2,  l3,  l4 on the other discernible.  The
property of being such that c is their fusion at w1 makes c discernible from s, b, l1, l2, l3, l4: the
former instantiates it, the latter do not. We might express this differentiating property through
a plural lambda-abstractor in the following way:
 
 
9 Henceforth,  we  will  formulate  the indiscernibility  principles  for  world-relative  identity  with  plural
quantifiers: as it is usual in plural logic (see for example  (Oliver and Smiley 2013, pp. 106–108)),
plural variables can take both singular and plural values. In the typical case involved in CCAI, one of
the relata of world-relative identity would be a single whole, while the other  relatum would be many
parts. 
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This property is one among many counterexamples to (Absolute Indiscernibility of
World-Relative  Identicals).  Any  case  of  contingent  composition  will  elicit  similar
counterexamples: the whole will  be discernible from its parts (while being world-relatively
identical to them), insofar as the whole is the fusion of itself at every world at which it exists,
while at some worlds the whole is not the fusion of those parts. 
World-relative  identity  obeys  a  different  indiscernibility  principle.  In  particular,  a
backer of CCAI will  want to claim that world-relative identity obeys a principle which – in
contrast  with (Absolute Indiscernibility  of  World-Relative  Identicals)  – does not  state that
world-relative  identicals  share  all  their  properties  (including  those  properties  which  are
relative  to  other  possible  worlds),  but  only  says  that  world-relative  identicals  share  the
properties relativized to that world. Such a restricted form of indiscernibility principle might be
expressed as follows:
(World-Relative Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals) 
 
Informally, for every world w, for every plurality xx and for every plurality yy, if xx are
identical to yy at w, then, for every property P, xx instantiate P at w iff yy instantiate P at w.
World-relative identity is such that relative identicals are allowed to instantiate and to fail to
instantiate  one  and  the  same  property:  the  properties  at  stake  (the  sources  of  the
discernibility of world-relatively identicals) are not relativized to the world at which the entities
are identical. Nonetheless, they are genuine sources of discernibility. The admission of these
sources of  discernibility  is enough to make world-relative identity  different  from standard
identity. For standard identity, it is utterly unacceptable that there is a property or relation
whatsoever (no matter what the property is relative to) such that standardly identical entities
instantiate  and fail  to instantiate it.  By contrast, this routinely happens with world-relative
identity, the kind of identity which – according to CCAI – composition is.
§ 7. The Charge of Adhocness
Let us take stock. Three main features differentiate standard identity from the kind of world-
relative identity which the backer of CAI is forced to introduce in the context of the Kripkean
view of modality. 
On the one hand, standard identity:
a1) is not relative to a possible world;
a2) holds necessarily (NI);
a3)  is  governed  by  an  unrestricted  principle  of  indiscernibility  (Indiscernibility  of
Identicals).
On the other hand, the kind of world-relative identity which characterizes CCAI:
b1) is relative to a possible world;
b2) does not hold necessarily;
b3)  is  governed  by  a  restricted  principle  of  indiscernibility,  i.e. (World-Relative
Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals), and does not obey (Absolute Indiscernibility of
World-Relative  Identicals),  i.e. the  unrestricted  principle  for  world-relative  identity  that
corresponds to (Indiscernibility of Identicals).
These differences determine both the success of CCAI and a risk for it. The success
consists in preserving the contingency of composition (CC) and of all the other mereological
relations, as well as the necessity of standard identity (NI). This result can be obtained only
by distinguishing two varieties of identity, the one necessary, the other contingent.
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On the other hand, the risk consists in the fact that the way in which world-relative
identity is introduced risks being ad hoc. On the basis of what we have said so far, indeed,
there does not seem to be any reason to think that there is a world-relative kind of identity,
besides the need to defend CAI. To say that the relation of composition between Benelux,
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg is an instance of identity relativized to the actual
world  does  not  seem to  be  a  way  to  assimilate  composition  to  an  already  known and
independently  characterized  relation.  CCAI  is  not  a  way  of  saying  that  composition  is
something else,  already known.  A foe of  CCAI  might  even insinuate  that  “world-relative
identity” is simply a new name for world-relative composition.
Composition, like any other standard property or relation, is relativized to worlds in
the context  of  the Kripkean view of  modality;  and then CCAI  tells  us  that  world-relative
composition and other cognate cases are world-relative identities. What is the content – the
foe of CCAI might ask – of this claim? Does it really say something interesting about world-
relative composition and cognate cases? In order to assess this charge of adhocness, let us
have a look at other applications of world-relative identity. 
§ 8. Contingent Composition as Identity and Other Doctrines of
Contingent Identity
Let us compare CCAI with other extant doctrines of non-standard identity, and in particular
with doctrines of contingent identity. Perhaps, these doctrines can point to other applications
of  world-relative  identity,  and  show that  CCAI  is  not  the  unique,  ad  hoc  motivation  for
introducing it. We will compare CCAI with Gibbard’s contingent identity (Gibbard 1975) and
with Gallois’  occasional identity (Gallois 1990, 1998). It is important to make clear that we
are not going to motivate or to endorse explicitly or implicitly these theories: we simply look
for other potential domains of application for CCAI’s world-relative identity, while keeping in
mind that  this  can alleviate  the charge of  adhocness  raised against  CCAI  only  if either
Gibbard’s theory or Gallois’ theory is accepted as true.
Let  us  begin  from  Gibbard’s  contingent  identity  proposal.  In  his  most  famous
example, there is a statue, Goliath, and a piece of clay constituting the statue, Lumpl. As a
matter of fact, Goliath and Lumpl persist during exactly the same period of time. They are
identical, but only contingently so: Lumpl might have persisted for a longer time, if the piece
of clay were squeezed into a ball before having the chance to dry. Thus, Goliath is identical
to Lumpl at the actual world, but there are other worlds (such as w1) at which Goliath is not
identical to Lumpl. In our language:10 
Gibbard does not adopt the Kripkean view of modality, which we have assumed in
developing  CCAI,  but  the  Carnapian  doctrine  of  individual  concepts.11 Thus,  the  modal
background  is  utterly  different  from ours  and  no  solace  from the  charge  of  adhocness
against CCAI is going to come from this aspect. 
Nonetheless, there is a significant link between Gibbard’s motivations for claiming
that Goliath and Lumpl are identical at the actual world and mereology. This link suggests
that it might make sense to apply world-relative identity (introduced above for the purposes
of CCAI) to Goliath, Lumpl and analogous cases. Let us see why.
Gibbard indeed claims that the main motivation for claiming that Goliath and Lumpl
are identical is that they are made of the same fundamental physical entities. More exactly,
10 In  (Gibbard 1975, p. 193) these claims are expressed by employing operators such as “in  w”
instead of our indexes.
11 In particular, Gibbard makes reference to the version of this doctrine set forth in (Bressan 1972).
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Gibbard claims that they are the same “set” of fundamental physical entities. In Gibbard’s
words:
Suppose, for example, we take point-instants to be our fundamental physical entities,
and let  a concrete thing be a set of  point-instants. In that  case,  Goliath  = Lumpl
simply because they are the same set of point-instants. (Gibbard 1975, p. 192) 
It  is easy to translate Gibbard’s set-theoretic talk in mereological  terms. The idea
becomes that Goliath and Lumpl would be the fusion of the same entities at the actual world:
Gibbard does not say explicitly why this is a reason to think that Goliath and Lumpl
are identical at the actual world, but this reason might be given by a principle in the vicinity of
Uniqueness of Fusion, an axiom in many presentations of classical mereology:
    (Uniqueness of Fusion)
Let us adapt (Uniqueness of Fusion) to the relativization to worlds of mereological relations
and introduce in it world-relative identity. We obtain the following principle:
      (Uniqueness of Fusion – Relativized)
Given (Uniqueness of Fusion - Relativized), the claim that Goliath and Lumpl are fusions of
the same fundamental physical entities at the actual world implies that Goliath and Lumpl
are identical at the actual world.
It seems that we can easily find a place for CCAI in this picture. No mention of any
forerunner of CAI is to be found in (Gibbard 1975). However, there is an apparent intimacy
between, on the one hand, the reasons why, according to Gibbard, Goliath and Lumpl are
contingently  identical;  on the other hand, the reasons why, in CCAI, a contingent, world-
relative variety of identity is introduced in order to make CAI compatible with the contingency
of composition (CC). 
Goliath and Lumpl might be different and are, as a consequence, only contingently
identical.  This difference typically  consists  in the fact that Goliath and Lumpl might have
different parts at some times. For example, we can suppose that at w1 Goliath is formed by
molding, at a certain point, Lumpl with a different piece of clay, Lumpm. The portion of clay
which  constitutes  Goliath  at  w1 is  Lumpn,  the  fusion  of  Lumpl  and  Lumpm.  From  the
viewpoint of CCAI, this means that Goliath is:
i)  composed  at  w1  by  different  fundamental  physical  entities  from  those  which
compose Goliath at @;
ii) is not identical at w1 to Lumpl (but to Lumpn, the fusion of Lumpl and Lumpm).
i)  and  ii)  are  grounded  in  a  single  difference  between  @  and  w1:  the  different
formation of Goliath determines  both a difference between @ and  w1 with respect to the
instances of composition involving Goliath and a difference between @ and w1 with respect
to the instances of identity involving Goliath. In this case (and in every other case in which
both  mereology  and  constitution  are  involved)  the  source  of  the  contingency  of  identity
according to Gibbard is also the source of the contingency of composition (CC) according to
CCAI. This gives at least a prima facie reason to think that CCAI and Gibbard’s contingent
identity might be consolidated in a single framework. The application of the world-relative
variety of identity to the relation between physical objects and pieces of matter would make
the application of world-relative identity to CCAI less specific and ad hoc.
In spite of this affinity of motivations, it should be admitted that the perspective of
integrating CCAI and Gibbard’s contingent identity in a cohesive framework is clouded by a
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couple of important differences. First – as remarked above – Gibbard adopts a non-Kripkean
view of modality, and he is, for example, simply silent on his view of possible worlds and
inter-world identity. Second, Gibbard’s contingent identity is said to obey Leibniz’s Law in its
absolute form, since – according to Gibbard, who makes reference to (Quine 1954) on this –
“expressions constructed with modal operators [...] simply do not give properties of concrete
things, such as statues of pieces of clay” (Gibbard 1975, p. 201). Thus, modal formulas do
not attribute properties, and there are – as a consequence – no modal properties in the
domain of properties upon which the indiscernibility principle quantifies. Inasmuch as there
are  no  modal  properties,  modal  properties  are  no  counterexample  to  (Indiscernibility  of
Identicals).  Gibbard’s  contingent  identity  is  therefore  said  to  obey  (Indiscernibility  of
Identicals).12 
Gallois’ doctrine of  occasional identity is another promising term of comparison for
CCAI and in particular a promising field of application for world-relative identity. This might
not be immediately evident, insofar as Gallois’ primary (but not exclusive, as we are going to
see) concerns are time and change, topics which might be relevant for CAI, but are not the
subject matter of CCAI and of this paper in general. A famous example of occasional identity
in  (Gallois 1990) is the following: at time  t’,  John has its entire brain; later, the left half of
John’s brain is transplanted in John-Left, while the right half of John’s brain is transplanted in
John-Right. According to Gallois, at t’ John-Left is identical to John-Right; however, at t’’  (a
time after the transplantation) John-Left is not identical to John-Right. The relation in which
John-Right and John-Left are at t’ and are not at t’’ is occasional identity.
Occasional identity does not respect an unrestricted principle of indiscernibility, but a
restricted  principle  which  is  structurally  similar  to  our  (World-Relative  Indiscernibility  of
World-Relative Identicals) above. We proceed as follows. First, let us see why occasional
identity does not  respect  an unrestricted principle of indiscernibility,  then we discuss the
similarity  between  Gallois’  restricted  principle  of  indiscernibility  and  our  (World-Relative
Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals). 
John-Right and John-Left are identical at  t’, in spite of having different properties at
t’’: suppose for example that only John-Right is bald at t’’ , while John-Left is not bald at t’’.
This means that only John-Right – and not John-Left – is bald at  t’’: thus, John-Right and
John-Left are discernible, but their discernibility at t’’ does not make them different neither at
t’ nor at any other time different from t’’. 
The discernibility principle for occasional identity at a certain time t is restricted to the
properties instantiated at  that  time  t.  We could formulate  the indiscernibility  principle  for
occasional identity as follows:13
(Time-Relative Indiscernibility of Occasional Identicals)
This  principle  can  be  obtained  from  Gallois’  correspondent  of  our  (World-Relative
Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals) by replacing the variable  w for worlds with the
variable t for times. 
Moreover,  (Gallois 1998, Chapter 6) develops a theory of contingent identity which
strictly parallels his theory of occasional identity and proposes at a point (page 145) that
contingent  identity  should  follow  a  modal  equivalent  of  (Time-Relative  Indiscernibility  of
Occasional Identicals), which corresponds to our (World-Relative Indiscernibility of World-
Relative Identicals):14
12 These differences might perhaps be disposed of by modifying either CCAI or Gibbard’s theory, but
we are not going to pursue this perspective.
13 See for example (Gallois 1998, p. 81). Gallois opts for indicating times with an “at t”. In our version
of the principle we replace the operator with a time index (and a world index below), for the sake of
consistency  with  our  presentation  of  CCAI.  Moreover,  Gallois  opts  in  his  works  for  a  schematic
formulation  of  indiscernibility  principles,  while  in  this  paper  we  always  formulate  indiscernibility
principles with a second-order quantification over properties. 
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 Gallois  also  explains  that  such  a  principle  cannot  replace  absolute  (Indiscernibility  of
Identicals) in the Barcan-Kripke argument for NI:15 the correspondent of our (World-Relative
Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals) in Gallois’ doctrine is a principle suitable for a
contingent variety of identity. 
Gallois, not differently from Gibbard in this respect, does not discuss any thesis akin
to CAI.  Nonetheless,  Gallois  makes some references to mereology,  which are useful  to
assess the extent at which CCAI and Gallois’ contingent identity might be integrated, thereby
addressing the charge of adhocness raised against CCAI. 
One of  Gallois’  examples of  contingent  identity16 concerns a car,  whose name is
“Car”, and the fusion of its parts, whose name is “Car*”. As a matter of fact, Car and Car* are
identical at every time, because they begin to exist and cease to exist at the same times and
no part of Car is ever replaced. Nonetheless – Gallois argues – Car and Car* apparently
differ in their modal properties: only Car – and not Car* – might have lacked a right front
wheel. The idea is that Car has a sort of mereological flexibility, which Car* lacks.17
Let us see if and how it is possible to insert CCAI in this picture. At the actual world,
Car and Car* have the same parts (at every time, but we omit in what follows any mention of
times, since they do not play any role in this example). “cc” is a plural constant for these
parts. At the actual world, according to CCAI, both Car and Car* are identical to these parts:
It follows, from these instances of CCAI and from the fact that =@ is left Euclidean,
that the same relation expressed by “=@” also connects Car and Car*:
There is no reason to doubt that this relation is the same relation of contingent identity which
– quite independently of CCAI – Gallois’ doctrine countenances between Car and Car*.18
Let us deepen a bit this integration. Car – in contrast with Car* – might lack a right
front wheel. w1 is a possible world at which Car is different from Car*, according to Gallois.
At w1 Car is the fusion of cc, while Car* is not the fusion of cc at w1. Once we add CCAI to
the picture, what happens is that Car is not identical to cc at w1, while Car* is identical to cc
at w1.
14 A  difference  between  this  principle  and  our  (World-Relative  Indiscernibility  of  World-Relative
Identicals) is that Gallois does not consider many-one or many-many cases of identity (and in general
does not employ plural tools). As a consequence, in presenting his doctrines, we restrain from using
plural variables, which are by contrast needed in (World-Relative Indiscernibility  of World-Relative
Identicals).
15 See in particular (Gallois 1998, pp. 160–165).
16 (Gallois 1998, p. 141).
17 See (Gallois 1998, sec. 5.IX) about the role of mereological (in)flexibility in Gallois’ doctrine.
18 Please keep in mind that we are simply developing some consequences of the interaction of CCAI
and Gallois’ doctrine and claims. Gallois’ claim that Car and Car* are the fusion of the same parts at
@ may be questioned for a variety of reasons. For example, one might suggest that the reasons to
distinguish  Car  and  Car*  at  a  certain  world  also  apply  to  their  parts;  in  general  the  reasons to
distinguish an artifact from the piece of matter constituting it seem to concern at the same degree both
the entire artifact (e.g. the car) and its parts, in particular its functional parts (such as the steering).
This suggestion is developed in (Varzi 2008). 
If you disagree with Gallois that Car and Car* are identical to the same fusion of parts, then this
specific example will seem wrong to you, but this has no direct consequence on the perspective of
integrating CCAI and Gallois’ doctrine of contingent identity.
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Thus,  Gallois’  doctrine of  contingent  identity seems to be expresible  through that
same  world-relativized  identity  which  CCAI  needs.  One  might  wonder  whether  also  his
doctrine of occasional identity might be analogously integrated with a temporal equivalent of
CCAI:  a form of  Occasional  Composition  as Identity  (OCAI).  What  might  happen in  the
integration of Gallois’ occasional identity and OCAI, in the example of John-Left and John-
Right above, would be that at  t’  (the time before the brain transplantation) John-Left and
John-Right would be temporally/occasionally identical not only one to another, but also to
their parts jj.
By  contrast,  at  t’’  (the  time  after  the  split  brain  transplantation)  John-Left  is  not
identical to John-Right, and neither of them is the fusion of jj: they have different parts (ll are
the parts of John-Left at t’’, rr are the parts of John-Right at t’’) and are, according to OCAI,
identical to these different parts at t’’.
 It is not possible to motivate and adequately develop OCAI in this paper (CCAI is
complex enough for a single paper!).19 However, it should be noted that the comparison with
Gallois’  doctrine  (in  which  occasional  identity  and  contingent  identity  are  analogously
motivated and structurally similar) suggests that, in general, the claim that composition is a
kind of  non-standard,  non-absolute,  relativized  identity  might  be harmoniously  integrated
with  other,  non directly  mereological  doctrines  of  non-standard,  non-absolute,  relativized
identity.
While  in  the  case  of  Gibbard  the  harmonious  integration  concerns  at  most  the
motivations (and not the way in which contingent identity is characterized), in the case of
Gallois the harmonious integration concerns also the way in which relativized identity would
work, in particular for what concerns the indiscernibility principle for relativized identity. All
things considered, we can say that, at least for those who think that there is some merit to
these theories of contingent identity, the charge of  adhocness  against CCAI is unjustified:
world-relative identity has other fields of application.    
§ 9. Contingent Composition as Identity and Weak Composition
as Identity
CCAI, besides being charged of being ad hoc (the charge we have discussed in § 8), might
also be suspected of not being a genuine form of CAI. This suspicion might be presented as
follows: CAI is the thesis that every instance of composition is an instance of identity, and
19 We  plan  to  discuss  OCAI  in  another  work.  The  more  direct  competitors  of  CCAI  are  the
combinations of CAI with counterpart theory and with the theory of modal parts (see § 2 and § 10).
Analogously, the more direct competitors of OCAI are the combinations of CAI with exdurantism and
perdurantism. As far as we know, neither of these combinations has been discussed in the literature
about CAI.
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there  is  prima facie  no evidence  that  the  identity  at  stake in  CAI  is  anything else  than
standard identity, which obeys an unrestricted principle of indiscernibility. Well, CCAI does
not  tell  us  that  composition  is  this  relation.  Quite  the  opposite:  CCAI  clearly  says  that
composition is  another relation, which is governed by different principles. CCAI, from this
viewpoint, risks being a denial of CAI, more than a version of it.
If, by stipulation, we establish that CAI is the claim that any instance of composition is
an instance of standard identity, then indeed CCAI is not a variety of this claim, but its denial.
Indeed, some backers of CAI construe it precisely in this way. For example,  (Bøhn 2014)
claims, in characterizing CAI, that “identity is the primitive relation everything bears to itself
and to nothing else, uniquely characterized” by reflexivity and Leibniz's Law (p. 143). Indeed,
CCAI is incompatible with Bøhn’s thesis. 
However, there are other versions of CAI and it  is sensible to consider CAI as a
family of theses, unified at most by the basic, generic contention that there is a significant
affinity between composition and identity. After all, neither of the original supporters of the
thesis in its contemporary form (Donald Baxter and David Lewis) would agree with Bøhn that
composition is standard identity. Baxter20 does not adopt standard, Quinean identity at all:
according to him, identity does not,  in general,  obey Leibniz’s  Law: identical  entities are
allowed to differ in properties and relations which are relative to so-called aspects. According
to Lewis,21 identity is indeed the standard relation, uniquely characterized by reflexivity and
by Leibniz’s  Law;  but  composition,  while  being  analogous  to  this  relation  under  several
important  respects,  falls  short  of  being it  and does not  obey an unrestricted principle  of
indiscernibility. In particular, a whole and its parts are discernible inasmuch as – for example
– the whole is one and not many, while the parts are – typically – many and not one. Thus,
there have been at least two prominent versions of CAI according to which composition is
not standard identity, and the fact that CCAI does not claim that composition is standard
identity does not disqualify CCAI from being regarded as a variety of CAI. 
In order to explain positively why CCAI  is a version of CAI and situate CCAI in the
debate about CAI, it is useful to resort to a taxonomy of the various versions of CAI and to
ask to which version of CAI CCAI is similar. There are several taxonomies in the literature.
For the sake of simplicity,  let  us select  one of them, namely the taxonomy proposed by
(Wallace 2011a, sec. 2).22 Wallace distinguishes Weak CAI, Strong CAI and Stronger CAI.
1) According  to  Weak  CAI,  composition  is  not  strictly  speaking  absolute,
standard, Quinean identity, but is analogous to it. It is identity in a broadened
sense. It does not obey some of the principles governing standard identity,
and in particular the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, but it is still
similar to standard identity under highly significant respects. It is the variety of
CAI set forth by one of the founders of CAI mentioned above – Lewis – and
later by (Sider 2007).
2) According to Strong CAI, any whole is strictly identical to all its parts taken
together and the identity at stake is standard identity, obeying an unrestricted
principle of indiscernibility; it is the variety of CAI defended by  (Bøhn 2014)
and (Wallace 2011b). 
3) According  to  Stronger  CAI,  composition  is  strictly  speaking  identity  (in
contrast with Weak CAI), but identity is not classically defined (in contrast with
Strong  CAI),  and  in  particular  does  not  obey  an  unrestricted  principle  of
indiscernibility. It is the variety of CAI set forth by the other founder of CAI
mentioned above, Baxter.  
20 (Baxter 1988a, 1988b, 2014).
21 (Lewis 1991, pp. 81–87).
22 Other taxonomies of the varieties of CAI are in (Cotnoir 2014; Sider 2007; Yi 1999).
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We are going to argue that CCAI is indeed better construed as a version of Weak
CAI, but let us begin by explaining why CCAI definitely cannot be a version of Strong CAI
and bears only some similarities (as well as some deep differences) to Stronger CAI.
CCAI is plainly incompatible with Strong CAI, since – as we have seen – CCAI does
not assimilate composition to standard identity and, in particular,  claims that composition
does not obey an unrestricted principle of indiscernibility, while Strong CAI precisely claims
that  composition  is  governed  by  an unrestricted  principle  of  indiscernibility.  By  contrast,
Weak  CAI  and  Stronger  CAI  agree  with  CCAI  (and  disagree  with  Strong  CAI)  that
composition does not obey the standard principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals; thus
CCAI is prima facie more compatible with them than with Strong CAI.
In discussing Stronger CAI we will follow the useful systematization of Baxter’s theory
in  (Turner 2014). Stronger CAI is a piece of Baxter’s wider revisionary theory of identity.
Baxter is committed to two notions of identity:  intra-count identity  and cross-count identity.
This kind of  dualism about identity makes Stronger CAI prima facie similar to CCAI, which
distinguishes two varieties of identity as well:  standard identity and world-relative identity.
However, a closer look to the two varieties of identity in Baxter’s doctrine shows that the
similarity with CCAI does not run deep. Let us first consider intra-count identity and then
cross-count identity.
 
Intra-count Identity and CCAI. Baxter’s intra-count identity concerns entities which
belong  to  the  same count,  where  a  count  is  –  roughly  –  a  way  to  divide  into  distinct,
countable entities the stuff reality consists in (Turner 2014, p. 230). Intra-count identity does
not respect an unrestricted principle of indiscernibility, inasmuch as one and the same entity
is allowed to be different from itself, due to the fact that the aspects of this entity determine
this difference. In Turner’s example, Jason is both a philosopher and a father. Jason spends
a lot of time doing philosophy. Jason as a father (qua father) does too much philosophy, but
it is not the case that Jason qua philosopher does too much philosophy. When aspects are
involved (as in Jason’s case), identicals are sometimes discernible. This means that intra-
count  identity  respects  only  a  restricted  form  of  indiscernibility  principle,  which  roughly
excludes properties depending on aspects.23
Intra-count identity does not really correspond to either of the two varieties of identity
countenanced  by  CCAI.  First,  intra-count  identity  does  not  correspond  to  world-relative
identity. Intra-count identity is, admittedly, superficially similar to the world-relative kind of
identity which CCAI countenances, inasmuch as intra-count identity is, in a certain sense,
relative to a count, as CCAI’s world-relative identity is relative to worlds. However, in spite of
this superficial similarity, there are two significant differences between CCAI’s world-relative
identity and Baxter’s intra-count identity. 
The first difference is that Baxter’s intra-count identity is not the relation in terms of
which  Baxter’s  version  of  CAI  is  formulated.  A  whole  and  its  parts  typically  belong  to
different  counts: Benelux on the one hand and the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg
on the other are the results of different ways of dividing the same stuff, and thus belong to
different counts. But intra-count identity is internal to a count, thus it cannot connect a whole
and its parts: it does not connect Benelux with the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.
By contrast, CCAI’s world-relative identity is  precisely expected to connect a whole and its
parts: the identity claim about a whole and its parts is formulated by CCAI in terms of world-
relative identity. 
The second difference is that the restriction on the indiscernibility principle for intra-
count identity does not consist in excluding from the domain of the second-order quantifier
the properties  relativized to a count,  while  in the case of CCAI the restriction in (World-
Relative Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals) consists in excluding from the domain of
the second-order quantifier the properties relativized to a world. By contrast, the restriction
for Baxter’s intra-count identity excludes properties depending on aspects, and is in general
23 See (Turner 2014, p. 230) for a discussion of various ways of making precise this restriction of the
indiscernibility principle for intra-count identity.
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required by Baxter’s theory of aspects, a piece of his doctrine which – quite independently of
its  intrinsic  merits  –  has  no  direct  relation  with  CCAI.  Thus,  the  restriction  of  the
indiscernibility principle for intra-count identity is not similar to (World-Relative Indiscernibility
of World-Relative Identicals), the principle of indiscernibility for CCAI’s world-relative identity.
Second, intra-count identity does not correspond to CCAI’s standard identity either,
because intra-count identity does not obey an unrestricted principle of indiscernibility, while
CCAI’s absolute identity obeys an unrestricted principle of indiscernibility. Thus, intra-count
identity does not correspond to either of the varieties of identity countenanced by CCAI.
Cross-count Identity and CCAI. The second variety of identity in Baxter’s doctrine
is  cross-count  identity.  Cross-count  identity  typically  connects  entities  which  belong  to
different  counts.  It  is  the  variety  of  identity  in  terms of  which  Baxter’s  variety  of  CAI  is
formulated.  Baxter  thinks  indeed  that  the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  are
distributively  cross-count identical to Benelux, and that – as a consequence – each of the
three countries is individually cross-count identical to Benelux. This is analysed in terms of
occupation of space regions: an entity x is cross-count identical to an entity y iff there is a
space region R such that x exactly occupies R and y pervades R. That x exactly occupies R
roughly means that x is entirely at R (there is no other region at which x is). That y pervades
R means that y fills R and perhaps more besides.24
There is also a many-one variety of cross-count identity. Some entities xx are cross-
count identical to y iff each entity which is one of the xx is individually cross-count identical to
y. Thus, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, which compose Benelux, are many-one
cross-count  identical  to Benelux,  inasmuch as each of  the three countries is  individually
cross-identical to Benelux. In general, in any case of composition the composing entities are
cross-count identical  to the composed entity. This is the point at which Baxter’s complex
doctrine finally qualifies as a variety of CAI, since it claims that any instance of composition
is an instance of (cross-count) identity.   
Baxter’s cross-count identity obeys a restricted indiscernibility principle. The details of
this restriction are rather complex (see (Baxter 1988a, p. 208; Turner 2014, p. 236) for some
discussion) and do not matter for the comparison with CCAI. As a very rough approximation,
an individual part and a whole are expected to share any property that does not depend on
counts (that is on the ways in which a portion of reality is divided in entities) or aspects.
Since cross-count identity (and not intra-count identity) is used in Baxter’s formulation
of CAI, one might hope to find a connection between it and CCAI’s world-relative identity, in
terms of which CCAI formulates its own claim that any instance of composition is an instance
of identity. However, this hope would be ungrounded, for at least the following three reasons.
First,  counts  and  worlds  have  no  interesting  mutual  connections:  different  counts  are
different ways of dividing the same stuff or the same portions of reality in entities; they are
not alternative ways in which reality might be (as possible worlds are), but different ways in
which the same  actually existing stuff is divided. Second, CCAI’s world-relative identity is
with  respect  to  worlds  exactly  the  opposite  of  what  Baxter’s  cross-count  identity  is  with
respect  to  counts:  world-relative identity  is  confined to a single  world,  while  cross-count
identity  connects  entities  in  different  counts.  Third,  CCAI’s  world-relative  identity  is  not
expected to hold between each individual part of a whole and the whole (as Baxter’s cross-
count identity does), but only collectively between the parts and the whole. 
Finally,  Baxter’s  cross-count  identity  does  not  correspond  to  CCAI’s  absolute,
standard  identity,  inasmuch  as  the  former  does  not  respect  an  unrestricted  principle  of
indiscernibility, while the latter does.
Thus, the affinity between CCAI and Stronger CAI does not go beyond the fact that
both doctrines are committed to a form of dualism about identity. At the end of the day, the
distinctions between two varieties of identity respectively drawn by CCAI and stronger CAI
24 (Turner 2014, p. 235) borrows this terminology from (Parsons 2007).
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are motivated by different  needs,  and the resulting  varieties of  identity  are governed by
different principles.
The last (and most promising) version of CAI at which to look for similarities, which
might make CCAI a legitimate form of CAI, is Weak CAI: the variety according to which
composition is not strictly speaking standard identity, but is significantly analogous to it, and
is therefore identity in a broadened sense. The general ratio of a comparison between CCAI
and Weak CAI is that CCAI claims that composition is world-relative identity,  and world-
relative identity is not standard identity, but is significantly analogous to it. Thus, through the
mediation of world-relative identity, CCAI ends up being the claim that composition is not
standard identity, but is analogous to standard identity: it ends up being a form of Weak CAI.
What  significant  analogy  is  there,  according  to  CCAI,  between  composition  and
standard identity, through the mediation of world-relative identity?25 The analogy concerns
the  indiscernibility  principles  they  obey.  CCAI  claims  that  world-relative  identity  obeys
(World-Relative Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals). (World-Relative Indiscernibility
of World-Relative Identicals) is not (Indiscernibility of Identicals), the unrestricted principle of
indiscernibility which governs standard identity. Yet, it is not much different: it excludes only
the properties relativized to worlds different from the world at which composition and world-
relative identity hold. 
Consider the instance of contingent identity which holds at @ between the chair and
its parts:
The chair and its parts at @ are only required to instantiate the same properties  at @. It
does not matter (it is not in contrast with (World-Relative Indiscernibility of World-Relative
Identicals)) that – say – l1, l2, l3, l4, s and b do not compose the chair c at another world w1
(an instance of the contingency of composition) or the fact that – say – the chair c is black at
w1,  while  l1,  l2,  l3 and l4  are blue at  w1 and  s  and  b  are white at  w1  (an instance of  the
contingency of non-mereological properties, which should be relativized to worlds as well in
the Kripkean view of modality assumed in CCAI).
The affinity between (World-Relative Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals) and
(Indiscernibility of Identicals) constitutes a significant analogy between world-relative identity
and  standard  identity,  thereby  bringing  forward  the  cause  of  Weak  CAI.  Although  not
unrestricted,  (World-Relative  Indiscernibility  of  World-Relative  Identicals)  is  indeed  an
inclusive and ambitious principle. Thanks to it, composition and cognate relations are indeed
analogous  (as  weak  CAI  contends)  to  standard  identity,  which  obeys  an  even  stronger
indiscernibility principle, namely unrestricted (Indiscernibility of Identicals). This is the reason
why CCAI can be sensibly seen as a form of Weak CAI, a version of CAI endorsed by one of
the original backers of CAI, Lewis. Thus, CCAI deserves to be considered a variety of CAI.
§ 10. Conclusions
It is now time to conclude by assessing some virtues and some limits of CCAI. CCAI is a
variety  of  CAI  which –  by  adopting  a  broadly  Kripkean view of  modality  –  succeeds in
preserving the contingency of composition (CC) and the necessity of standard identity (NI).
This does not mean that CCAI is true. 
25 The analogy we are going to discuss is independent from the analogies discussed by Lewis in his
original presentation of Weak CAI  (Lewis 1991, pp. 85–86) and our claim  is not that Lewis would
accept the analogy we discuss. 
Lewis  discusses  five  analogies  between  composition  and  identity.  These  analogies  concern  –
respectively – ontological innocence, unrestricted composition, uniqueness of composition, the ease
of describing fusions if you have already described the fused entities, and the necessary colocation of
a whole and its parts. Many of these analogies are strictly dependent on Lewis’s doctrines about
mereology, and each of them is highly controversial.  See  (Carrara and Martino 2011) for various
objections to Lewis’s claims.
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First, CCAI is simply limited to the modal aspects of composition and identity and
does not address in any way the non-modal objections which have been raised against CAI
and might be rehearsed against CCAI. To exemplify:  CCAI adopts the ambitious (World-
Relative Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals), and this principle – as we have seen in
§ 9 – is pivotal in justifying the ambition of CCAI to be a variety of CAI. However, (World-
Relative Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals) might be false for reasons which have
nothing to do with modality: for example because cardinality ascriptions or other kinds of
predications falsify it. Lewis himself (the main backer of Weak CAI) would object to (World-
Relative Indiscernibility of World-Relative Identicals) that the chair c is one and not six at @,
while  l1, l2, l3, l4, s  and  b  are six and not one  at  @. In order to answer this objection, the
defender  of  CCAI  would  need  to  borrow  from  other  varieties  of  CAI  the  strategies  for
relativizing cardinality ascriptions to concepts or ways of counting, and it is controversial that
these strategies work.26
Second, even if we lay the non-modal problems of CAI aside, the problem remains
whether  CCAI  is  any  better  of  its  competitors  on  the  modal  terrain.  CCAI  should  be
compared to other ways of avoiding (Merricks 1999)’s attempt to refute CAI on the basis of
NI,  such as the adoption of counterpart  theory in order to reject NI  in  (Bøhn 2009) and
(Borghini 2005) and the adoption of the theory of modal parts in order to make the rejection
of CC acceptable in (Wallace 2014). 
We have seen in § 8 that the charge of adhocness against CCAI can be answered by
showing that other doctrines of contingent identity point to other applications of world-relative
identity,  the  non-standard  variety  of  identity  countenanced  by  CCAI.  However,  this  puts
CCAI at most on a par, from this viewpoint, with its competitors on the modal terrain, but not
above them.  Indeed,  several  doctrines  apply  counterpart  theory to various  philosophical
problems (quite independently of CAI), so that the adoption of counterpart theory may not be
sensibly charged of being ad hoc. Also the theory of modal parts, while being less common,
has been sometimes adopted for reasons independent of the need to defend CAI.27  
A  comparative  difference  among the  three  alternatives  approaches  to  the  modal
aspects of CAI might consist in the ability of only one or two of them to solve other, non-
modal problems of CAI. However, the only extension to other problems of CAI which comes
to our mind concerns time. We have indeed suggested that CCAI might be extended to a
theory of occasional composition as identity, OCAI. But also the theory of counterparts and
the theory of modal parts have some obvious extensions in the temporal domain, so that
also in this case no alternative seems to gain an edge over the others. 
It  seems to us that,  at  the  end of  the  day,  the  choice among CCAI  and its  two
competitors mainly depends on the view of modality adopted. The most virtuous order in
which one should proceed is:  first,  choose  the best view of  modality;  second,  if  you are
convinced by CAI’s general motivations, develop CAI in a way compatible with the best view
of modality. Inasmuch as CAI is a controversial thesis, which can be developed in a variety
of ways, it would be methodologically unwise to proceed in the reverse order, i.e. to choose
the best version of CAI and adopt a certain view of modality in order to accommodate it. 
It is not the ambition of this paper to decide which is the best view of modality. The
Kripkean view on the basis of which we have presented CCAI enjoys a primacy in modal
logic. In particular, the thesis that there is inter-world identity is embodied in the fact that
model structures (the most common semantical tool for modal logic) do not exclude that the
domains  of  different  worlds  overlap.  However,  we  have  no  inclination  to  think  that
philosophers should look to what is more common in logic in order to choose the best view
of modality.  Our ambition is more modest:  we hope to have shown that CAI is not  only
compatible with counterpart theory and the theory of modal parts, as the existent literature
had already shown, but also with the view that there is inter-world identity. CAI is not refuted
by modal considerations and does not force you to adopt a different view of modality. By
26 See  (Bøhn 2014; Cotnoir 2013; Hovda 2005; Wallace 2011b) for these strategies and  (Carrara
and Lando 2017) for a recent critical analysis.
27 (Graham 2015; Schlesinger 1985; Torrengo 2011; Varzi 2001).
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contrast,  CAI  can be developed in  the context  of  the Kripkean  view in an original  form
(CCAI), which squares with other doctrines of contingent identity.
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